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CORRUPTION: PROFILE OF POLITICAL 
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The subject of the paper is related to the tainting of the public contract award process and the conse-
quences generated by it: corruption in public procurement, which is a major problem of the Roma-
nian economy, recognised and pointed out both at the national and at the European level. The study 
provides empirical evidence that between 2009–2013 there were many companies that repeatedly 
win public procurement contracts and do business only (or almost only) with the local and central 
authorities (contracting authorities who represent the interests of political parties). At the theoretical 
level, the profi le of these companies, called political companies, is identifi ed.
Keywords: contracting authorities, corruption, political companies, profi le, public procurement, 
work contracts, Romania
JEL classifi cation indices: H40, M13, O10
1. INTRODUCTION
In the European Union, the expenditures incurred in the public sector for the 
procurement of goods, services and works amount to almost 2,500 billion euros 
(European Commission 2014a). The largest part of these contracts must observe 
certain common public procurement procedures in all member states.
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Competition for the award of public procurement contracts is high. The foun-
dation of the relevant legislation aims at ensuring the free movement of goods 
and services within the common market. For this reason, the award of the public 
procurement contracts must be made based on the following principles: non-dis-
crimination, equal treatment, transparency and proportionality, and correlation 
between the necessity, the object, and the requirements of the public procurement 
contract.
The competitive public procurement procedures do not exclude the possibil-
ity of the emergence of corruption (Burguet – Che 2004; Lambert-Mogiliansky 
– Sonin 2006). Over time, the media has indicated the existence of companies 
that win public procurement contracts suspiciously often. These companies spon-
sor political parties, or have direct or indirect connections with politicians. The 
aspects related to the political connections and the allocation of procurement 
contracts have been studied in the literature (Hellman et al. 2000; Compte et al. 
2005; Hyytinen et al. 2009; Coviello – Gagliarducci 2010; Goldman et al. 2013). 
It was also shown that electoral competition represents a cause of corruption in 
public procurement (Frøystad et al. 2010). Sensational cases of corruption in pub-
lic procurements, manifested at the political level, have been reported in many 
European Union (EU) member states, and through the first anti-corruption report 
published by the European Commission in February 2014, corruption in public 
procurements was recognised as an issue at the EU level.
Specialists’ concerns relating to corruption in public procurements are generat-
ed by the fact that the process of awarding public procurement contracts provides 
a number of opportunities for developing inappropriate behaviours, one part of 
which is susceptible of being regarded as acts of corruption. The problem exists 
outside the EU, too. Several international bodies have developed guidelines and 
codes of ethics with the purpose of preventing, identifying, and applying certain 
measures to combat corruption in the process of awarding public procurement 
contracts (OECD 2007a, 2007b; United Nations Office for Project Services 2011; 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2013).
The studies carried out so far prove that the tainting of competition in the award 
of public procurement contracts is a phenomenon that affects large segments of 
the public administration (Søreide 2002); a phenomenon which is manifested at 
the level of certain EU member states, despite the existence of Community leg-
islation on public procurement (OECD 2010; Directorate General for Internal 
Policies 2013). 
The tainting of competition in the award of public procurement contracts has 
many direct and indirect effects. Direct costs are related to social inefficiency, cost 
overruns, implementation delays, and efficiency loss, including lower quality and 
questionable usefulness (Auriol 2006; Coppier – Piga 2006; Wensink – Maarten 
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de Vets 2013; Dastidar – Mukherjee 2014). In 2014, Hessami published a theoret-
ical model indicating the proportional increase of countries’ corruption indicators 
and the shares of rent-creating public spending in government budgets.
Public procurements are an important source of corruption in Romania as well. 
While public procurement contracts account for approximately 25% of the GDP of 
Romania (European Commission 2012), and the average EU level is below 20%, 
the interest of the firms in business with the state is very high. The misuse of public 
tenders is a frequent practice and results in the emergence of political companies – 
companies that repeatedly win public procurement contracts and do business only 
(or almost only) with the state: like elsewhere, there companies and/or their owners 
sponsor political parties or have personal connections with politicians representing 
public authorities. The companies surviving almost exclusively due to contracts 
with the state are either directly owned by politicians or belong to politically-
 controlled people. In the Romanian media, their name is “family companies”. 
The objectives of this study are: (a) the introduction of a new concept in the 
“corruption dictionary”, namely that of “political companies”; (b) empirical re-
search on the hypothesis according to which political companies are a reality of 
the Romanian public procurement market; (c) identifying the profile of political 
companies in Romania.
2. CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENTS IN ROMANIA
There are various tricks of tainting competition: (a) formulating certain quali-
fication and/or selection criteria that favour a certain company; (b) providing 
confidential information (including about competitors’ offers) to one firm only; 
(c) formulating restrictive criteria that limit the participation of others; (d) mutual 
understanding between the favoured company and the contracting authority by 
which the initial offer includes low prices, but the final price of the contract is 
increased by concluding annexes for various “unforeseeable” works; (e) selective 
transmission of the tender call to certain companies; (f) misuse of governmental 
declared state of emergency (e.g. during floods) with the hidden purpose of nego-
tiating the public procurement contract with only one firm, etc.
According to the information supplied by the National Authority for the Regula-
tion of Public Procurements (a public institution, subordinated to the Government, 
with functions of regulating, monitoring, surveying, and controlling the public pro-
curement market), the main violations/incompliance are: (a) violating the public-
ity rules by the late submission for the awarding publication notices; (b) breaching 
the operation principles of the public procurement system by imposing restrictive 
qualification requirements and/or requesting qualification requirements for sub-
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contractors, failure to submit for publication the decision to cancel the award pro-
cedure and failure to observe deadlines provided for the submission of answers 
to the requests for clarifications; (c) applying the negotiation procedure, without 
fulfilling the conditions provided by the law; (d) incorrect application, within the 
assessment process, of the criteria set in the award documentation; (e) concluding 
contracts with a value exceeding the threshold set by the law, by direct procure-
ment; (f) documents missing from the public procurement file; (g) incomplete 
communications on the result of the public procurement procedure. 
According to the National Anticorruption Directorate (NAD), the warning sig-
nals concerning fraud and/or corruption in the public procurement processes can 
be seen in:
–  The stage of preparation and publication (vague technical specifications, very 
detailed specifications; long decision-making circuits; requests for informa-
tion immediately before or after the publication of the call for tender);
–  The submission of the documentation (small number of bidding offers; 
missing documents; short deadlines; “perfect offers”);
–  Assessment and negotiation (the same staff performs all the assessments; 
price figures or errors corrected by hand; major discrepancies between the 
initial and the final scores given by assessors; an abnormal distribution of 
the price);
–  The implementation (copies of invoices; forged quality certificates; frequent 
staff changes; the use of many amendments to contracts or closed tenders; 
significant changes in prices compared to the prices initially offered; unfin-
ished projects).
The frauds discovered by NAD indicated, among others, the following pat-
terns: (a) the procurement of low-quality, useless, or very expensive products; (b) 
payments made for unfinished constructions or incomplete works; (c) payments 
made for undelivered goods or non-provided services.
The problem of corruption in public procurement in Romania is closely related 
to the practices that characterise the political environment. Political parties re-
ceive annual subsidies from the public budget and through donations. Any dona-
tion exceeding a certain limit is confiscated and returned to the state budget (Law 
334 of 17 July 2006). However, the real cost of election campaigns far exceeds 
this limit and this is why political parties are tempted to accept unrecorded and 
undeclared donations.
Several former ministers investigated for acts of corruption in public procure-
ment stated that they financed their political parties in order to facilitate their po-
litical support and to keep their public function. They confirmed of that all politi-
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cians who have access to public functions paid significant amounts of money for 
this purpose. Moreover, the managers of the companies involved in the respective 
public procurement proceedings stated that they had paid “fees”, set as percent-
age from the value of the public procurement contracts won, in exchange for the 
support of politicians. These amounts went into the accounts of political parties.
3. METHODOLOGY
Our study is based on the assumption that the misuse of public procurement pro-
cedures is more frequent in the case of the contracting authorities where the po-
litical parties are present: the central and local public administration.
Another working assumption is that companies which frequently win public 
procurement contracts are companies controlled by politicians. We will call them 
political companies. The existence of these companies revolves around the public 
budget. These companies should be given a certain distinct name in the specialised 
literature, in order to be customised in the business environment, with the purpose 
of simplifying the exposure about them in future research. Political companies 
have a low number of customers because they are “subscribed” to the public pro-
curement contracts awarded by certain contracting authorities. Political compa-
nies cover certain geographical areas, politically dominated by a certain party. 
The first stage of research consisted of creating a database comprising ob-
servations collected from work contract award notices submitted for publication 
in the Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union (SOJ), during 
2009–2013. The option for the analysis of the work contract award notices sub-
mitted for publication in the SOJ is determined by the following aspects:
–  factors that influence the opportunities for corruption (Heggstad et al. 2010): 
the size of the contract (the larger the contract, the bigger the bribe) and the 
sector involved (some sectors are more prone to corruption than others, such 
as construction, oil and gas, property development, and manufacturing). The 
contracting authorities in Romania have the obligation to publish the calls 
for tenders/award notices in the SOJ if the estimated work contract value is 
higher than or equal to the RON equivalent of the amount of 5 million euros;
–  due to the lack of all filters/rules for entering data into the Electronic Sys-
tem of Public Procurement (the communication platform used in Romania), 
data are erroneously entered by the contracting authorities. Consequently, in 
my opinion, Tenders Electronic Daily (TED, the online version of the SOJ, 
dedicated to European public procurement) provides a much more reliable 
base for the collection of data.
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The total number of the observations was 1,643, broken down by years and the 
type of works contract, as shown in Table 1.
The first statistics concerning the public procurement market in Romania be-
gan to be collected in 2012. At that time, it had a value of 12.5 bn euros, of which 
work contracts had a value of 6.7 bn euros (National Authority for the Regulation 
and Monitoring of Public Procurements 2013). Consequently, the number of ob-
servations in the database used in the study (the value of the work contracts pub-
lished in the SOJ) accounts for approximately 70% of the total value of the work 
contracts awarded by the contracting authorities in Romania and is sufficient to 
provide the validity of the conclusions. 
The announcements concerning work contracts published in the SOJ provided 
the information concerning the type of work contract (utilities works, transport 
infrastructure works, building construction, and other works), the value of the 
contract, the contracting year, the type of public contracting authority (central au-
thority, local authority, public institution, and public company), the type of firms 
(single Romanian firms, single foreign firms, consortium of Romanian firms, 
consortium of foreign companies, consortium of firms) and the name of the firms 
(the name of the consortium leader). The public contracting authorities were di-
vided into four categories: 
–  Central authorities (ministries, chambers of Parliament, specialised bodies 
subordinated to the government);
Table 1. Our database
Type of contract Utilities 
works
Building con-
struction and 
other works
Transport infra-
structure works
Total
2009 Number 108 82 92 282
Value (mill. euros) 641 657 1,388 2,686
2010 Number 101 94 103 298
Value (mill. euros) 961 548 1,199 2,707
2011 Number 129 137 156 422
Value (mill. euros) 805 1,213 3,779 5,797
2012 Number 133 135 80 348
Value (mill. euros) 768 1,148 2,771 4,686
2013 Number 73 144 76 293
Value (mill.  euros) 510 1,542 1,615 3,667
Total – number 592 544 507 1643
Total – value (mill. euros) 3,684 5,107 10,751 19,542
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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–  Local authorities (prefectures, town halls, local councils, county councils, 
intercommunity development associations). They are specialised structures 
through which, as public power authorities, laws are enforced, or, within the 
limits of the law, public services are provided;
–  Public institutions (educational units, medical and sanitary units, libraries, 
museums, etc.); 
–  Public companies (legal entities performing economic activities, which are 
directly or indirectly under the dominating influence of a contracting author-
ity). These are government business enterprises and trading companies in 
which the state or a local public administration company is a shareholder.
4. DATA ANALYSIS
Local authorities contracted the largest number of works, but public companies 
hold the first place in terms of the value of work contracts (Figure 1).
Most work contracts were awarded to Romanian firms (Figure 2). 
As we can see, the public procurement market in Romania is dominated by 
Romanian firms. Nevertheless, in the years 2012–2013, the number of foreign 
companies which were awarded work contracts increased. Similarly, the success 
of consortia was much more frequent at the end of the analysed period compared 
to its beginning. This shows the internationalisation of the public procurement 
market (Figure 3). 
Figure 1. Distribution of work contracts, in terms of number and value, 
depending on the type of the contracting authorityies
Source: Author’s calculations.
72 D. PIRVU
Acta Oeconomica 65 (2015)
Figure 2. Distribution of work contracts, in terms of number and value, 
depending on the type of firms
Source: Author’s calculations.
Figure 3. Structure of firms, depending on the value of public work contracts
Source: Author’s calculations.
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The trend towards the internationalisation of the public procurement market is 
a positive signal, because the possibility to misuse the public procurement proce-
dures is lower if the firms are foreign.
The cross-tabulation proves that the variables – the type of the contracting 
authority and the type of the firm – are correlated (Table 2).
Local and central authorities conclude public contracts with Romanian firms 
or with their consortia. The bivariate Chi-Square test was used to study the rela-
tionship between the variable type of contracting authority and the variable type 
of the firm. The Pearson Chi-Square Value (882.196) and the “Sig” (.000) value 
is lower than 0.05, indicating the existence of a statistical relationship between 
the variables.
The results of the statistical tests were also confirmed by the quality research of 
the data. The 1,643 public work contracts were awarded to 583 companies. There-
fore, on average, one firm was awarded approximately three public work contracts 
during the analysed period. The cases when the same firm was awarded more than 
five work contracts occur especially when the contracting authorities are local or 
central authorities. All the cases of this type (25 firms which were awarded more 
than five work contracts by the local or central public authorities) were analysed 
in order to build a profile of the political companies in Romania. The public work 
contracts awarded to the 25 firms accounted for approximately 30% of the total 
value of the public work contracts. The analysis was based on data in the statistics 
published by the Ministry of Public Finance on its own website concerning the 
financial and accounting statements of the respective companies.
In order to analyse the assumption that these companies have common char-
acteristics, representing political parties, I used the hierarchical cluster analy-
sis, the Z scores method. The formation of a dominating cluster would confirm 
my assumption .  
The variables selected as criteria for grouping were as follows: the average 
number of employees, the average profit/loss, the average turnover, the average 
Table 2. The cross tabulation of variables: 
the type of the contracting authority and the type of the fi rms (numbers)
Romanian 
single firms
Foreign 
single firms
Association 
of Romanian 
firms
Association 
of joint firms
Association 
of foreign 
firms
Public enterprises 225 28 57 22 11
Local authorities 498 15 133 21 11
Public institutions 349 45 109 49 15
Central authorities 41 0 10 1 3
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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value of total capital, the average value of fixed assets and the average value of 
public work contracts. The cluster method selected was Between-groups linkage 
and the range of solutions was between 2 and 4 clusters. The results of the cluster 
analysis are presented in the form of a dendrogram (Figure 4). The names of the 
firms in the database were replaced with letters from A to W (see Annex 1).
We can note the existence of a voluminous cluster composed of more than 75% 
of the companies. The companies in the cluster have on average 200 employees, 
an annual profit of approximately 1 million euros, a turnover of approximately 
20 million euros, total equity capital, and fixed assets lower than 10 million euros . 
The average value of the public work contracts (mean of the cluster) represent 
approximately 70% of the average turnover (mean of the cluster).
Figure 4. Dendrogram using average linkage (between groups)
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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The results of the research were validated by allocating ”red flags” (corruption 
indicators) to companies in the cluster. The red flags were selected according to 
the criteria defined in the study Identifying and Reducing Corruption in Public 
Procurement in the EU (2013). For the configuration of the corruption indicators, 
information collected from the Public Procurement Electronic System (ESPP) 
was used in relation to work contracts awarded to the respective companies be-
tween 2009 and 2013 (Annex 2), and the results were summarised in Table 3. 
ESPP is an open platform allowing the implementation of a full cycle of electron-
ic public procurement in Romania. In ESPP, all public contract award notices are 
published, regardless of their value. The ESPP database enables the obtainment 
of information about the public procurement proceedings used. 
Red flags are present in the vast majority of the companies. Corruption indica-
tors (red flags) 12, 14, 23, 25 are the most frequent. Red flag 9 (Tender exception-
ally large) does not seem to be an indicator of corruption in Romania. The final 
value of the contracts awarded to the 25 analysed companies represents 80–90% 
of the estimated value. However, it should be mentioned that the incorrect esti-
mation of the value of public procurement contracts by overestimating them is a 
frequent corruption practice in public procurement. 
5. CONCLUSIONS
In recent years, the results of the activity of National Anticorruption Directorate 
(NAD) resulted in many convictions of politicians with public functions (minis-
ters, mayors, chairmen of county councils), demonstrating that there is a worsen-
ing of the corruption issue in the public procurement. 
The study of NAD press releases from the 2008–2014 period highlighted that 
the managers of the companies included in the dominating cluster (except 2) are 
investigated in relation to corruption acts in public procurements. NAD prosecu-
tors mainly showed that the managers of the respective companies bribed politi-
cians and public administration employees in order to win public contracts. In 
some cases, the money was used to finance election campaigns. This study proves 
the existence of a distinct category of companies in the Romanian business envi-
ronment, namely political companies. 
The existence of political companies in Romania is highlighted by the follow-
ing aspects:
–  The frequency of awarding a large number of work contracts to the same 
firm is higher in the case of local and central authorities (which represent 
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the interests of political parties) than in the case of other types of contracting 
authorities;
–  A small number of firms (25) completed approximately 20% of the tenders 
and 30% of the value of the work contracts awarded in the 2009–2013 pe-
riod by the contracting authorities in Romania following the announcements 
published in the SOJ;
–  Almost the entire activity of the above-mentioned companies is ensured by 
public work contracts.
The analysis of the data in the European public procurement electronic journal, 
related to work contracts awarded by the contracting authorities in Romania, and 
the statistics published by the Ministry of Public Finance for the 2009–2013 pe-
riod highlights the following profile of the political companies in Romania:
–  These are medium-sized companies from the point of view of the number 
of employees;
–  Carry out profitable business;
–  Most of their turnover is represented by earnings from work contracts 
awarded by the central and local public authorities;
–  The ratio between the average value of the fixed assets and the average 
value of the total capital is close to 1;
–  Capital is used efficiently.
Our study proved the existence of a direct relationship between the number 
of the red flags of a company and the diversity of the clients. Thus, companies 
with few red flags are characterised by a lower number of contracts awarded by 
the contracting authorities whose heads belong to the same political party. The 
membership of the head of the contracting authority in the same political party 
seems to be a signal of corruption in public procurements, also confirmed by the 
fact that when certain political parties lost the elections locally, this virtually gen-
erated the disappearance of the political company from ESPP. For example, after 
2012, when the leaders of the contracting authorities to which company A was 
subscribed lost the local elections, this company was awarded only one public 
contract by open tender performed by a joint venture.
Political companies are a signal of the existence of corruption in public pro-
curements. Knowing the profile of the political companies would allow special-
ists to develop a tool for signalling the risk of the emergence of corruption in 
public procurement, but this is a further research direction. A future research di-
rection can also be the substantiation of a new red flag: the membership of the 
manager of the contracting authority in the same political party.
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D 696 –13,860 424,228 119,137 116,520 145,645 7
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F 103 5,413 28,447 21,217 8,443 41,624 8
G 215 1,547 74,794 37,329 35,809 28,013 7
H 240 240 52,515 377,634 41,25 33,216 5
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Notes: Names of the companies are the following: A: Confort SC; B: Constructii Erbasu SC; C: Delta Antrepri-
za de Constructii si Montaj 93 Ltd; D: Deltacons SC; E: DiferitLtd; F: Drumuri si Poduri Mures Ltd; G: Geiger 
Transilvania Ltd; H: General Trust Arges Ltd; I: Grup Corint SC; J: Integral SC; K: Iridex Group Constructii 
Ltd; L: Romconstruct Holding Grup SC; M: Selina Ltd; N: Romstrade Ltd; O: Tancrad Ltd; P: Tehnic Asist Ltd; 
R: Tehnodomus SC; S: Tehnologica Radion Ltd; T: Tel Drum SC; U: Trans Baco Ltd; V: Transmir Ltd; X: Vega 
93 Ltd; Y: Viarom Construct SC; Z: Victor Construct Ltd; W: Recon SC.
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